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ABSTRACT
The paper attributes the behavior of U.S. inflation to four sets of
factors: aggregate demand shifts; government intervention in the form of
the Nixon price controls and changes in the social security tax rate and
the effective minimum wage; external supply shocks that include theimpact
of the changing relative prices of food andenergy, the depreciation of
the dollar, and the aggregate productivity slowdown: and inertia that makes
the inflation rate depend partly on its own lagged vlaues.
Considerable attention is given to alternative methods of measuring
the impact of government intervention, including the Nixoncontrols, Kennedy—
Johnson guideposts, and the Carter pay standards. The results imply that
direct intervention has been futile, since the guidelines andpay standards
had no effect at all on inflation, while the Nixon—era controls hadonly a
temporary impact that stabilized both the inflation rate and the level of
real output.
Some previous studies have had a problem in explaining why inflationwas
so rapid in 1974 and have been forced to conclude that the termination of the
Nixon controls raised prices more than the imposition of controls had lowered
them. We find that much of the explanation of rapid inflation in 1974 is
the same as that in 1979—80: the shortfall of productivity growth below its
ever—slowing trend rate of growth raised business costs and forced-extra
price increases, and the depreciation of the dollar in 1971—73 and 1978
boosted the prices of exports and import substitutes. Rapid demandgrowth,
the 1979—80 oil shock, the depreciation of the dollar, the productivity slow-
down, and payroll tax increases all help to explain why the inflation rate
accelerated between 1976 and 1980 by much more than was generallyexpected
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In the past decade inflation has been both the leading macroeconomic
problem and the bane of forecasters. Not only has the inflation rate been
higher on average than in any earlier peacetime decade, but it has accel-
erated from roughly 5 percent in 1970 to 10 percent in 1980, and it has
exhibited an unprecedented variability throughout the decade. Sensible
advice to policymakers on anti—inflation strategy requires that economists
be able to decompose the inflation of the 1970s among its principal
causes.
At the beginning of the decade the standard explanation of inflation
was based on an expectational Phillips curve (EPC) equation in which there
was typically one aggregate demand variable, usually representing the
tightness of labor markets, and one variable representing inertia and
gradual price adjustment, usually the influence of lagged prices on current
wages and prices. The basic inflation equation developed in this paper
supplements the simple EPC approach with an extra aggregate demand variable
and six types of supply shifts. The demand variable is the rate of change
of nominal aggregate demand. The supply variables include the effect of
government intervention in the inflation process (particularly during the
Nixon control era), the impact of changing relative prices of food and
energy, of minimum wage changes, and of payroll tax changes, the change in
the effective foreign exchange rate of the dollar, and, finally, the effect
of changes in both the actual and trend growth rates of labor productivity.1
Thus the main themes of the paper are that inflation cannot be explained
simply as the result of excessive aggregate demand stimulation, nor of a2
single type of supply shock, nor of the effect of inertia by itself. An
adequate explanation of postwar U. S. inflation, both before and after 1970,
requires treatment of several different channels by which aggregate demand
inf1uerces inflation, of several different episodes of government inter—
d
vention,of several types of supply shocks, and of the inertia in the in-
flation process that limits the speed with which prices can adjust to
demand and supply shifts
A central topic in this paper is the interaction between the estimated
effects of the Nixon controls and of the other variables. As Blinder and
Newton (1978) discovered, some traditional price change equations that
freely estimate separate coefficients for the impact of the controls
and for the effect of their removal——hereafter labelled the "on" and "off"
coefficients——yield the conclusion that the 1974 "off" effect was sub-
stantially larger than the 1971—72 "on" effect. Stated another way, price
change equations with a traditional specification cannot explain why in-
flation was so high in 1974, and the introduction of a free dummy variable
for the 1974 removal of controls often leads to the estimate of a large
coefficient for this "off" effect. The more complete specification in this
paper that includes additional variables provides an improved explanation
of inflation in 1974 and yields "on" and "off" coefficients that are of
roughly the same size. The fully specified equation has the important by-
product that it is able to explain why the inflation rate for products
other than food and energy accelerated so much between 1977 and 1980.
The preferred price change equation developed in this paper is con-
trasted with two simpler approaches. The first is a naive ARIMA model
that explains inflation entirely by its own past values. The ARIMA model3
represents an extreme view that the inflation process is entirely dominated
by inertia and is unaffected by changes in current exogenous variables.
Nevertheless, an ARIMA price change equation provides an interesting stan—
dard of comparison for a more complete specification and provides a link
to the early evaluation of the Nixon controls program by Feige and Pearce
(.1976)that used the ARIMA technique.
The secondalternative approach is a simple monetarist equation that
makes the rate of change of prices depend only on a distributed lag of
past changes in the money supply. While this framework is taken more
seriously by journalists and laymen than by academic economists, a "money
only" explanation of inflation is implicit in some recent tests of the
classical equilibrium approach to macroeconomics.2 We shall see that the
residuals of both the ARIMA and money—only approaches yield an estimate
that the Nixon controls had a significant effect on the timing of inflation,
just as does the more complete specification.
This paper attempts to do more than simply present a preferred in-
flation equation. In addition it attempts to characterize the nature of
changes in the inflation process during the past decade. The effect of
each variable is examined both in an equation estimated for the full 1954—
80 period and for the shorter 1954—71 period. Post—sample dynamic simula-
tions of the short—period equations help to reveal the particular aspects
of inflation in the past decade that are explained by shifts in coefficients
in the full—period equations.
Several limitations are imposed to control the size of the paper.
First, no attention is paid to alternative specifications of the impact of
aggregate demand on the inflation process; the impact of alternative "supply"4
variables are studied within a single demand specification) Second, all
equations explain the rate of change of prices in relation to lagged price
changes, and there is no attention given to the determinants eIther of the
change in wages or in the relation of prices to wages. Third. with one ex-
ception all of the price equations use a single dependent variable, the
fixed—weight GNP deflator. Without these restrictions the pa?er would
grow to book length, since there is an almost infinite number of possible
combinations of dependent variables (different neasures of wages and prices)
and independent variables.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF DATA AND FORM OF EQUATIONS
StinmaryStatisticsDescribing th.e Data to be Explained
Thebasic features of inflation in the 1970s——both its overall ac-
celeration and its high variance——stand out in Table 1. Means, standard
deviations, and simple correlations are presented there for quarterly rates
of change of prices, of nominal GNP, and of the money supply (M1B), and
the level of the "output ratio," that is, the ratio of actual to natural
real GNP.5 Five twenty—quarter (half—decade) intervals are coranared for
the period between 1954 and 1979.
The table suggests that all three rate of change variables acceler-
ated by about five percentage points between the earliest and latest of
the five intervals. The fact that inflation accelerated between the first
and last halves of the 1970s seems to conflict with the substantial nega-
tive value of the outputratiorecorded inthe last half; this raaysuggest








Weight GNP Nominal Output
Deflator CNP IIlB Ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1.Means
a. 1955:Ql—1959:Q4 2.37 5.49 1.69 —1.01
b. 1960:Ql—1964:Q4 1.25 5.39 2.65 —2.02
c. 1965:Ql—1969:Q4 3.62 7.78 4.80 3.15
d. 1970:Ql—1974:Q4 6.34 8.42 5.90 0.07
e. 1975:Ql—l979:Q4 7.16 10.51 6.72 —2.84
2. Standard Deviations
a. l955:Ql—1959:Q4 1.22 5.39 2.34 2.41
b. l960:Ql—1964:Q4 0.59 3.48 1.98 1.67
c. l965:Q1—1969:Q4 1.28 2.54 2.73 0.79
d. 1970:Ql—1974:Q4 2.84 3.58 2.05 2.04
e. 1975:Ql—1979:Q4 1.68 3.91 2.19 2.19
3. Simple Correlations with
Inflation Rate
a. l955:Q1—1959:Q4 .24 —.06 .60
b. 1960:Q1—1964:Q4 —.36 .08 .10
c. 1965:Ql—1969:Q4 —.12 .06 .26
d. 1970:Q1—1974:Q4 —.10 —.35 —.24
e. l975:Q1—l979:Q4 .14 .34 .436
the rate of change of nominal GNP or money are important in explaining
changes in the inflation rate.
The middle section of Table 1 indicates that the variance of inflation
was greater in both halves o.f the 1970s than in earlier periods, and that
the variance was especially high during the first half of the decade. In
contrast the variance of nominal GNP and money growth were not unusually
high during the 1970s. Fluctuations in the output ratio in 1970—79 were
similar in magnitude to those during 1955—64, as contrasted with a temporary
period of stability in 1965—69.
How were the alternative demand variables correlated with the inflation
rate during the five periods? The relatively high positive correlations
between inflation and the output ratio——the traditional Phillips curve
relationship——are evident for 1955—59 and 1975—79, while the appearance of
a perversely sloped Phillips curve shows up in the data- for 1970—74. The
correlations with nominal GNP change are weak throughout, with a surprising
negative correlation in the early l960s. The negative correlation of in-
flation with money growth in the first half of the l970s contrasts with
the positive correlation in the last half.
Table 1, then, provides a preview in crude form of some of the con-
clusions we reach later: the data for the early l970s, including the high
variance of inflation and the negative correlation with demand variables,
suggest an important role for supply shocks in the inflation process. The
data for the late l970s imply not only that a traditional demand—based
explanation of inflation may be relevant, but that the negative average
level of the output ratio during 1975—79 may give a misleading indication
of slack demand.7
"Structural" versus Reduced-For'm Approaches
The study of inflation in most past research has been based on a two—
equation approach,one for wages and one for prices. Thewage equation
typicallyadhered to the EPC specification described above, and the price
equation illustrated the tendency for the price level to be "marked up"
over some concept of unit labor cost, that is, the wage rate divided by
labor productivity. Often the wage and price equations werepart of a
supply—side block in a large—scale econometric model that also included
equations explaining key labor market variables like the unemployment and
labor force participation rates. The wage equation wasgenerally taken
to represent the outcome of events in the labor market, with the influence
of aggregate demand channeled through "labor markettightness" variables
like the unemployment rate, while the price equationwas generally taken
to reflect events in the commodity market, with the influence ofaggregate
demand channeled through proxy variables likeinventory—sales ratios and
unfilled orders.
In recent years, however, it has becomeapparent that the two—equation
approach is both misleading and inconvenient. First,wage and price equa-
tions cannot be distinguished as truly structuralequations applying to
behavior in particular markets. The behavior ofwages, for instance, can
be explained just as well by real GNP as by labor marketvariables like
unemployment, suggesting that the wage equation does not provideus with
any special insight about the working of labor markets.6 Second, tradi-
tional wage and price equations areparticularly prone to simultaneous
equations bias. If current prices explain wages and currentwages explain8
prices, then the coefficient on a variable that influences both simultan-
eously——whether a demand proxy like real GNP or a supply variable like
price—control effects——may be biased downward.7 For instance, if the true
impact of controls on wages and prices differs each quarter, while their
effect i restricted in an econometric equation to operate through dummy 4
variables that are uniform each quarter, much of the true impact may be
soaked up by the price coefficient in the wage equation and wage coefficient
in the price equation rather than by the coefficient of the dummy variable.
Third, the use of two equations leads to an artificial separation of the
variables that "belong in each equation. For instance, the payroll tax
has often entered wage equations, but never price equations. Thus the
large impact effect of the employers' portion of the payroll tax in raising
unit labor cost is implicitly assumed to be shifted forward into prices by
the same coefficient as an average wage change. Any absorption of some of
the tax burden by firms will be missed unless the payroll tax variable is
entered symmetrically into both the wage and price equations. Finally, the
two—equation approach is inconvenient and clumsy, The full impact of a
variable on the inflation rate cannot be learned from the simple inspection
of a table, but requires multiplying and adding coefficients. The answer to
virtually any interesting question requires the computation of model
simulations that must include the auxiliary equations needed to generate the
labor market variables typically included in the wage equation.
On all of:these counts a simple reduced—form inflation equation,
which relates the rate of price change to its own lagged values and other
variables, seems superior. The equation is openly a convenient character-
ization of the data rather than an attempt to describe structural behavior;9
it is less prone to (though not immune from) simultaneous equations bias;
it automatically includes the effect of every variable on both wages and
profits; and it is easier to inspect, interpret, and simulate. Subsequent
work on separate wage and price mark—up equations can help to allocate the
effects of particular variables between wage and profit behavior, but this
seems a distinctly secondary research task to building an improved under-
standing of the inflation process itself.
ho-Lce of Dependent Variable andSamplePeriod
The GNP deflator seems the natural choice as dependent variable in a
study of the basic U. S. inflation process. Given any specified path of
nominal GNP and "natural" (or potential) real GNP, determination of the
path of the GNP deflator automatically yields as a residual the ratio of
actual to natural real GNP (hereafter "the output ratio"), the key indicator
of the economy's utilization rate and cyclical performance. The output ratio,
in turn, leads to predictions of the unemployment rate as long as Okun's
law remains reasonably accurate.
We have selected for analysis the fixed—weight rather than the implicit
CNP deflator. Twoargumentssupport this choice. First, the implicit
deflator, based on current—period expenditure weights, confounds price
changeswith changes in the mix of output. Just as studies of wage infla-
tion now commonly use a fixed—weight wage index, we believe that studies of
aggregate U. S. inflation should use the fixed—weight GNP deflator in order
to insulate true price changes from shifts between expenditure categories.
A second disadvantage of the implicit GNP deflator arises below in section
VI, where we begin to include nominal GNP growth as an explanatory variable.10
The level of the implicit GNP deflator can shift from quarter to quarter as
the weight of particular expenditure categories shifts. In quarters when
there are large changes in a particular type of expenditure, e.g., during
4
thequarter of an automobile strike, nominal ON? and the deflator could ex-
hibit a positive correlation, even if there were no effect of nominal GNP
changes on any individual price change. Use of the fixed—weight deflator
eliminates this source of spurious correlation between inflation and nominal
demand changes.
The sample period of the inflation equations developed in this paper
runs from l954:Q2 to 1980:Q2. The starting date is chosen to retain com-
parability with previous, papers and to simplify the presentation by omitting
consideration of the peculiar impact of speculation and government inter-
vention during the 1950—53 Korean war period.8 The ending date is the
latest quarter of data available when most of this research was carried
out. Each alternative specification considered below has also been estimated
for the shorter sample period 1954:Q2 —l971:Q2in order to use post—sample
dynamic simulations to evaluate price behavior during the Nixon controls
period. Equations examined in section VI also are estimated for l954:Q2—
l977:Q4, in order to determine the ability of various equations to forecast
the acceleration of inflation between 1977 and 1980.
III. METHODOLOGY ANDMODELS
Probi ems inEstimating the Impact of Oontrols
Ourvarious reduced—form inflation equations are of the general form:
(1) Pt11
where Pt iS the rate of inflation, x is a vector of explanatory variables
(some of which may be endogenous in the context of a large econometric
model), and the subscript !t_it! refers to variables lagged one or more
periods. The two primary purposes of equations like (1) are retrospective
and prospective policy evaluation. Once the coefficients of the f( )furction
have been estimated, the effects of different policies in the past or future
can be represented by the calculation of alternative values of price change
providing that the policy shifts can be interpreted as a change in
one or more of the explanatory variables. Thus the estimated f( )function
can be used to calculate:
(2) Pt =
where the hypothetical alternative values of the relevant explanatory
variables are designated by an asterisk.
The measurement of the effects of wage—price control policies differs
from that of monetary or fiscal policies for two basic reasons. First,
there is no long continuous relationship between the quantitative h,xu
variable and the dependent variable to allow a coefficient for controls to
be estimated. During most periods in the past there were no controls. Even
when they were in effect, there is generally no official measure of the im-
pact of the program for inclusion as an explanatory variable.9 Second, the
existence of separate control programs in past periods, e.g., guidelines in
1963—66 and Nixon controls in 1971—74, prevents us from treating each
separate program or even each phase of a program as a single continuous
zero—one dichotomous variable, since controls programs differed in their
comprehensiveness and tightness.10 Thus there seems little alternative to12
the two basic techniques used in this paper, (1) the introduction ofseparate
dummy variables for each program, and (2) the construction of post—sample
simulations to evaluate a program based on coefficients estimated from a
previous no—controls interval.
There are numerous pitfalls in the use of either the dummy variable
or simulation technique:
1. The model may be erroneously specified and omit one or more ex-
planatory variables. Movements in the omitted variable during the controls
period may be correlated with the imposition and/or removal of controls
and thus bias the controls coefficient in either direction. For instance,
since aggregate demand growth (either money or nominal GNP) speeded up
during the 1971-72 controls imposition period and slowed dom during the
1974 controls removal period, the omission of this negatively correlated
variable will tend to bIas downward the effect of controls estimated by
either the dummy variable or simulation technique.
2. Sometimes a misspecification can bias the conclusion of the simula-
tion technique more than that of the dummy variable technique. A simulation
designed to evaluate the 1971—74 controls program is usually based on a set
of coefficients for the f( )functionestimated to the pre—1971 period.
Unfortunately 1971—72 marks the beginning not only of the controls, but also
of flexible exchange rates. Since there was little variability in the
foreign exchange rate of the dollar before 1971, a post—sample simulation
records errors in years like 1974 and may attribute them to controls rather
than to the impact of the omitted variable. In contrast the dummy variable
technique allows use of the full post—1971 sample period and allows any13
variable to enter, even if it exhibited no variancebefore 1971.
3. There are corresponding disadvantages ofdummy variables. First,
a choice must be made of the applicable dates of theprogram. This choice
is particularly difficult for the "rebound" impact of thetermination of
controls on the price level, since this impactmay be spread out over several
quarters after the legal termination date. For semi—voluntaryprograms like
the Kennedy—Johnson guidelines, there was nolegal implementation or termina-
tion date.1 Second, a dummy variable that is set ata uniform value for
the whole period of a program's implementation forcesits impact to be
uniform each quarter. While the varying comprehensivenessof implementation
can be tracked by the Blinder—Newton variable that shows thepercentage of
prices controlled each month between 1971 and 1974, their variable doesnot
measure the tightness of controls or indicate how promptly firmsresponded
to changes in the rules.
4. Some parameters in price equations are measuredwith wide confidence
intervals. In other cases the data cannot distinguish betweenalternative
hypotheses. Thus alternative specifications that fitequally well may
yield differing evaluations of the efficacy of a particularprogram of con-
trols. However, this source of ambiguity inevaluating the effect of con-
trols is no different from that found inmany time—series econometric studies.
5. The measured impact of a controlprogram depends on what is taken
to be exogenous. If the "output ratio" is theonly exogenous demand variable,
then the coefficient on a controls dummymeasures the downward displacement
of a short—run Phillips curve. If nominal CNPgrowth is held constant when
controls are implemented, then any such downwarddisplacement will raise the14
the output ratio and, if the short—run Phillips curve linking inflation and
the output ratio is positively sloped, will cause actual inflation to de-
crease less than the vertical downward displacement measured by the controls
dummy. In short, the actual behavior of inflation reflects the combined in-
fluence of the controls in S72 tz7g the Phillips curve and in causing the
economy to move along the curve. Coefficients on controls effects measured
in equations that contain the output ratio or other demand variables isolate
the shift in the curve. This approach seems correct, since ifaggregate
demand policy allowed the displacement effect of the controls to be dissi—
pated by movements along the curve, this should not be taken to meai that
the controls "had no impact."
6.Measurement errors may be important if controls cause distortions
in price measurement. To the extent that controls are binding and are ac-
companied by rationing, there is some vector of shadow prices at which the
rationed quantities would be preferred, utility—maximizing amounts of those
goods (Tobin and Houthakker, 1950—51). In this welfare sense, the ?ttrueVv
GNP deflator that is relevant for individual utility functions is then a
weighted average of actual prices for uncontrolled goods and the shadow
prices of controlled goods. Such a price concept rises during a control
period relative to the actual deflator. Thus to the extent that rationing
is important, the use of the actual deflator overstates real income in the
welfare sense and hence understates the Tttruel? rate of price increase. The
main impact of controls measured below occurs in 1971—72, when there were
few reported cases of shortages. The main impact of the removal of controls
on measured prices occurred in 1974. Since there were widespread shortages
reported in 1973, the actual beneficial impact of controls may have evaporated15
in 1973 instead of in 1974. But this point seems only to influence timing
and not to deny the two main conclusions reached below——that the cntro1s
did have an impact on prices in 1971—72, and that the beneficial was
only temporary.
Choiceof E-)aluatjon Techniques and .?xoZanatory Models
Themost common technique used to evaluate the impact of the i:on
controls during the first round of research in 1971—73 was the cor'arison
of the actual path of inflation with the path projected in the dynamic
simulation of a model estimated for the pre—controls period. This technique
is used again here, with equations estimated for the period ending in 197l:Q2
simulated to evaluate the Nixon controls and for the period ending in l977:Q4
used to evaluate the voluntary Carter pay standards. The results from the
dynamic simulations of the 1954—71 equations are supp1etented with an alter-
native evaluation based on the coefficients of dummy variables included in
equations for the full 1954—80 period, in order to use information from the
decade of the 1970s on the impact of variables that were important during
the Nixon controls interval but not before 1971, especially the effect of
flexible exchange rates.
The "basic" equation developed below in section VI represents our best
effort to describe the inflation process during 1954—80 using a sinole
reduced—form equation. The specification developed there has already proved
its usefulness in studies of a longer historical period stretching sack to
the late nineteenth century. In addition, sections IV and V present for
the sake of comparison two much simpler models. Section IV presents an
ARIMA model of the inflation process that imposes no structure at oil on16
the data, except for the restrictiveassumption that inflation depends only
on its own lagged values. Section V presents a model inwhich the only
explanatory variables are current and lagged changes in themoney supply,
thus forcing the impact of inertia to work through thecoefficients on
lagged money, and excluding the impact of other variablesthat play a role
in the complete specification of Section VI.
IV.THE ARIMA MODEL
Methodology and Speolfication
Astraightforward way to view the evolution ofany time series is as
a univariate stochastic process. Following Quenouille (1957),Zellner and
Palm (1974) provide a justification for thispractice. We start from a
linear dynamic equation system relating jointlycovariance stationary
variables,
(3) H(B)x F(B)e,
where H(B) and F(B) are finite polynomial matrices in thelag operator,
is the vector of variables, ande is a vector of independent white noise






where H is adjoint to H. The 1th variate has the representation
H(B)Jx. =17
where IH(B)Iis a scalar polynomial and is the th row of H(B)F(B).
Because the sum of independent moving average processes of order q is also
a moving average process of order q, x. has the ARMA(autoregressivemoving
average) representation
(5) =
wherea.is scalar white noise, c(B) =jH(B)I,andO.(B)isa finite poly- it 1
nomialin the lag operator.
It is clear that the a will be, in general, correlated. Because this fact
1
isoverlooked in univariate time series work, such models must be inferior to
multiple time series models that exploit these correlations. Feige and
Pearce (1976) have used univariate ARIMA models to assess the effects of
the Nixon controls.12 While we find univariate ARIMA models inadequate
to quantify the dynamics of the inflation process, this approach is useful
as a point of departure for our more complete specification developed in
section VI.
Our ARIMA analysis concentrates on second differences of the logarithm
of the quarterly fixed—weight GNP deflator((l_B)p). The data plot and auto—
correlation function of (l_B)p show no indication of nonstationarity. The
autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function each have a
single significant peak at lag 1; the partial autocorrelation function has
smaller peaks at lags 3 and 5. These facts suggest, but do not demand, an
ARIMA (0,1,1) model, i.e., (l_B)p =(1_QB)at.'3This accords with the
finding of Granger and Newbold (1977) that appropriately differenced
economic time series are often well represented by low order moving18
average processes.
When a variety of low order ARA models were fit to the datafor
quarters excluding the Nixon controls interval (i.e., l954:Ql—1971:Q2
plus 1975:Q2—1980:Q2) .weobtained the. following estimates.
Parameter Estimates Model
Line Designation Autoregressive Moving Avera S.E.E. Q
1. (0,1,0) ——---- ———— —--- —--—— 1.20 27.2
2. (2,1,0) —.4.3 -.12 ---- -——- 1.06 16.5
3. (1,1,0) -.42 -——— ---- -——— 1.08 15.1
4. (1,1,1) —.35 ———— .10 ———— 1.08 14.5
* 5. (0,1,1) ———— ———- .52 -—-— 1.07 10.1
6. (0,1,2) ——— .51 .02 1.08 99
*
Indicatessignificance at the 95 percent level.
While line 2 has the lowest standard error, its Q statitic ishigher than
the models listed on lines 3 through 6.15 The fact that the secondauto-
regressive parameter of line 2 is not significantly different from zero
mirrors the fact that the standard error of line 2 is notsignificantly
less than line 3. Therefore, line 3 is preferred to line 2. Line 5
dominates line 3, so the ARIMA (0,1,1) model is selected asan adequate
univariate representation of the inflation process. When estimatedonly
over the pre—.controls period l954:Ql—l971:Q2, this model has as its single
parameter 0 .57, a standard error of estimate of 1.00, and Q10.0.
Estimated controls Effects
As is true throughout this paper, both the dummy variable and post—
sample dynamic simulation techniques areusedto evaluate the impact of
the Nixon control program. Both methods require that we establish the19
timing of the program, since both dummy variables and calculations of post—
sample simulation errors must be dated. Because the controls program began
as a surprise, there is no reason to believe it had any effect before
August 15, 1971, and thus it is assumed that the program had an immediate
impact on inflation beginning in 1971:Q3.
As for its duration, the controls program is alternatively assumed to
restrain inflation through Freeze I only (1971:Q4), through Phase II (l972:Q4),
and through Preeze II (1973:Q3). Periods of catchup inflation due to the
removal of controls are assumed alternatively to begin immediately after
the periods above, and after the end of Phase IV (l974Q2). In any event,
the rebound effect from the controls program is assumed to have run its
course a year after the final dismantling of the controls program (1975:Ql).
The use of dummy variables in ARIMA models, i.e., intervention analysis,
is slightly ore complicated than in usual regression (see Box and Tiao, 1975).
Suppose non—controls inflation follows (l—B)p=(l_eB)a,and controls
and the subsequent rebound are thought to depress and increase mean infla-
tion. Then,
(6) Pt =l:BBa+ + w2OFF,
and






in which a is a white noise, justifying conventional multiple regression.
Because
=1—B(1—6)(l+OB+62B2+..20
each variable in (7) is first transformed by deducting an exponential
weighted moving average of prior values.
Estimated coefficients of "on" and "off" controls effects from equa-
tions estimated for the interval 1954:Q2 through 1980:Q2 are reported in the
upper part of Table 2. The standard error and Durbin—Watson statistic for
a regression without transformed intervention dummies is reported in column
(1). These statistics compare unfavorably with those associated with the
ARINAmodelsreported in the previous section because of the addition to
the sample period of the control quarters 1971:Q3—1975:Q1. The statistics
also compare unfavorably with those of the other columns in Table 2,sug-
gesting that some modeling of the controls episode is preferable to none.
In columns (2) through (5) the reported coefficients are of the total
cumulative effect of the program on the price level. That is, the "on'
and "off" variables are scaled so that they add to 4.0 over the fullperiod
they are in effect. Column (2), for example, estimates that by the end of
Phae II prices were 2.9 percent lower than they would have been had there
been no controls. The catch—up inflation beginning after Freeze IImore
than eliminated this gain, and in the price level woundup 1.53 percent
higher than otherwise (i.e., 1.53 equals the 4.43 "off" effect minus the 2.90
?QTV effect). The equations in columns (4) and (5) alsodisplay significant
restraint of inflation in the controls period, while all of theequations in
columns (2) through (5) exhibit a significant post—controls rebound effect.
Thebottomof Table 2 exhibits results from a dynamic simulation in
which the ARIMA parameter estimated for the periodending in l97l:Q2 is
used to generate post—sample forecasts, with forecast rather than actual
values used as the lagged dependent variable for allquarters after l971:Q2.TABLE 2
Alternative Estimates of Nixon Controls Effects
in ARIMA Models Estimated to the Period l954:Q2_l980:Q2a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1."On" Effect
a. 1971:Q3—1971:Q4 ———— ———— —0.64 ———— ————
b. 1971:Q3—1972:Q4 —--—— —2.90*
———— 'c
—3.14 ————












a. S.E.E. 1.25 1.12 1.19 1.15 1.16





a. "On" Error ———— —1.94 —0.81 —1.93 —0.70
b. "Off" Error ———— 7.46 5.28 5.28 5.28
aThO dependent variable is 400 times thequarterly first difference of the
log of the fixed weight deflator, filtered as described in the text.
*
Indicatessignificance at 95 percent level.
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The resulting simulated values of Pt are the best estimate that can be
produced by the ARINA model of the inflation that would have occurred
after 1971:Q2 based on information available at that date. The numbers
displayed in lines 4a and 4b of Table 2 represent the difference between
the actual and simulated values for the various sub—periods designated in
lines 1 and 2. Thus the simulation error in each column corresponds to the
time period of the dummy variable used in the intervention analysis shown in
the same column.
The ARINA model estimated does much better in explaining why there
was so little inflation during mid—1971 through mid—1973 than in explaining
why there was so much inflation between mid—1973 and early 1975. In
short, the total amount of inflation between mid—1971 and early 1975 is
underpredicted by the dynamic simulations.
Whydoesthe underprediction occur in the dynamic simulation but not in
the intervention analysis in the upper part of Table 2? In contrast to the
simulated value, which uses a parameter estimated from the 1954—71 period
to generate the lagged dependent variable, the dummy variables are estimated
in equations for 1954—80 in which the actual lagged dependent variable is
used. Thus any variables other than the controls that influenced actual
inflation after 1971, e.g., oil and food prices, are implicitly taken into
account in the intervention analysis in the upper part of the table but not
by the simulation analysis in the lower part. This, of course, is one of
the disadvantages of the simulation technique cited in our methodological
discussion above.23
V. A "MONEY—ONLY" EXPLANATION OF INFLATION
Recently a great deal of attention in the U. S.empirical macroeconomics
literature has been focussed on models in which theprice change process is
driven by little other than current and laggedchanges in the money supply.17
In such models there isno role for supply shifts, either in the
form of the Nixon controls or changing relativeprices of food and energy,
and any inertia in the price—settingprocess is forced to enter through the
lagged money terms rather than through lagged priceterms, which are excluded
by assumption.
Column (1) of Table 3 is basedon an equation for 1954—80 that explains
price change as a function only of aconstant, the current rate of change of
M1B, and 27 lagged changes in money, where thelagged coefficients are
estimated by the polynomial distributed latechnique. As is evident in a
comparison of column (1) in Tables 2 and 3, the ARIMA andmoney—only models
fit the data equally well, withrespective standard errors of 1.25 and 1.27
percentage points (recall that the dependent variable isexpressed as a
percentage annual rate). We shall see in ction VI that thesestandard
errors are relatively large, in the sense that the standarderror in explain-
ing the same dependent variable for the samesample period can be cut almost
In half by using a more completespecification of the inflation process.
The rest of Table 3 is arrangedexactly like Table 2. Lines 1 and 2
exhibit coefficients on dummy variables estimatedfor various "on" and "off"
periods in equations that also include current andpast monetary changes.
The general pattern of the dummy variablesis very close to that of Table 2;
all "on" dummy coefficients are within0.50 of each other in the twotables,TABLE 3
Alternative Estimates of Nixon Controls Effects
in Equations Explaining Inflation
by Current and Lagged Monetary Growtha
Estimated to the Period l954:Q2—1980:Q2












b.1974:Q2—1975:Ql 3.04. 3.07 3.06
3.Sum of Coefficients onb * * * * *
Current and Lagged Money1.47 1.43 1.41 1.46 1.47
4. Regression Statistics
a. S.E.E. 1.27 1.04 1.13 1.05 1.07
b. D.W. 1.06 1.54 1.38 1.60 1.54




a."On" Error —3.46 —1.10 —3.46 —3.75
b. TOff" Error 5.34 4.09 4.09 4.09
aThe dependent variable is 400 timesthe quarterly first difference ofthe
logof the fixed weight deflator.
Sum of 28 distributed lag coefficients constrained to lie on a fifth degree
polynomial with zero end constraint.
*Indicates significance at 95 percent level.
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and all "off" coefficients are within 1.00 of eachother. It is interesting
that columns (2), (4), and (5) in Table 3 display "on"and "off" coefficients
that are fairly close in absolute value,indicating that there is no puzzle
of unexplained high inflation in 1974 from thepoint of view of these equa—
tions. A final remark on the 1954—80 results is thatthe standard errors of
the money equations in Table 3 that includedummy variables are uniformly
better than the corresponding equations of Table 2.Although there is more
evidence of positive serial correlation in themoney results, this is to be
expected in view of the bias in Durbin—Watson statisticspresent when a lagged
dependent variable is included, as in Table 2, but not Table 3.
Lines 5a and 5b of Table 3 display errors inpost—sample simulations
of equations estimated for 1954—71 that includeonly a constant term and cur-
rent and lagged money. In contrast to the simulation resultsin Table 2,
there does not seem to be a serious problem ofunderprediction of price change
during the 1971—75 period. In column (5), which includes all buttwo of the
quarters between l971:Q3 and l975:Ql, the cumulative "on"error and "off"
error are about equal in absolute value, whereas in Table 2 thecorresponding
column indicates a cumulative underprediction of about
4.5 percentage points.
Whyshouldthe post—sample simulations of the money—onlyequations be
more adequate in explaining cumulative inflation during 1971—75?The answer
is implied by the simple summary statistics of Table1. The naive ARIMA
model is forced to predict inflation in 19 71—75only on the basis of informa-
tion available about inflation during 1954—71 and thushas no basis upon
which to explain the high average rate of inflationduring 1971—75. In
contrast the money—only version explains high inflationduring 1971—75
-
throughthe contribution of the acceleration inaverage monetary growth that26
occurred in the early l970s, as well as through the contribution of its long
lag distribution when multiplied by the relatively rapid rate of money growth
that occurred in the late 1960s. In short, the money—only post—sample
simulation has a piece of evidence on what actually happened in the early
l970s, the acceleration of money growth, whereas the ARIMA simulation has no
information at all on what actually happened in the early 1970s. This inter-
pretation also helps to explain why the dummy variable and simulation tech-
niques give roughly the same results in Table 3 and not in Table 2. In
Table 3 the two techniques use essentially the same information and differ
only on the estimated coefficients; in contrast in Table 2 the two techniques
are based both. on different information and on different coefficients.
VI. A MORE COLETE SPECIFICATION OF THE INFLATION PROCESS
Relationof the Reduced-Form Specification to Conventional Wage and PriceEquations
Thetwo previous sectIons examined the effect of government intervention
in the price—setting process within the context of two extremely restricted
models. The ARIMA specification implies that inflation depends only on its
own past values, i.e., that "inertia" is the only element in the inflation
process. The money—only approach combines a pure demand framework in its
introduction of current monetary changes with a role for inertia through the
inclusion of lagged monetary changes. Yet both specifications exclude many
variables that may in fact help to explain inflation, especially supply factors
like oil and food prices, productivity growth, payroll taxes, and the minimum
wage. We may also ask whether there is any role in the inflation process
for the traditional Phillips curve variable that represents the impact of27
aggregate demand, i.e., the level of the unemployment rateor the output
ratio.
Our more complete specification begins withseparate equations explain-
ing wage change and the relation of prices towages, which we then combine
to eliminate the wage variable. In the subsequent discussionupper—case
letters represents logs of levels of variables and lower—caseletters repre-
sent rates of change; where possible the notation is chosento correspond to
that in Gordon (l980a). Our basic demandvariable, representing the effect
on inflation of labor-market tightness and thepressure of excess commodity
demand, is the output ratio the log of the ratio of actual real GNP
to "natural"real GNP (Q), i.e., = — Q.The role ofexcessdemand
is always entered both as a level and also as a rate of change
The rate of change of wages(we) is assumed to depend on lagged price
changes plus the "equilibriu" growth in the realwage (Xe), the
level and rate of change of the output ratio,supply shifts in the wage
equation(), and an error term (ce):
(8) w =c0(p1+ A)+ciQ + a2q.+ct3z +
The actualgrowth in the real wage rate (relative to last period's inflation
rate) will not be at the equilibrium rate unless =1and all the other
variables in the equation (Q, q , z , and chave realizations equal to zero. t ty wt
Among the supply shifts (z) that might enter thewage equation are the
impact of government controls and ofchanges in the payroll tax and minimum
wage rate. Because w is the same variable thatenters the price equation,28
it is implicitly defined as "gross employer labor cost" including employer—
financed fringe benefits and payroll taxes.
The price mark—up equation relates current price change to the
current change in "standard" unit labor cost (w —o),
the same demand
variables as appear in (8), a vector of supply shift variables (zr) that
influence the level of prices relative to wages, and an error term
Pt Ot c) 2ci 3ptpt
The fact that the current wage enters the price equation, but only lagged
price change enters the wage equation, is an expositional convenience that
is not essential for what follows. Among the supply shift variables (z)
that could enter into the price equation are government controls, changes
in foreign exchange rates and in the relative prices of food and energy,
and shifts in indirect tax rates. In principle, capital costs should enter
into the price equation, as in Gordon (1975), but capital costs complicate
the exposition without providing any substantial improvement in the explana—
tion of inflation that is provided below.
When (8) is substituted into (9), we obtain a reduced—form inflation
equation:
(10) Pt =00t-l+8oo)+lolt +
+ Z+8o.z +c +c
3ptO3wt ptOwt29
The long—run equilibrium properties of (10) can be seen more easily ifwe
combine the separate z variables, error terms, and coefficients from the
wage and price equations:
(11) Pt = +y0(X_a) + + 1iQ + + +




What are the conditions necessary for (11) to generate a constant
equilibrium rate of inflation? First, the coefficient on lagged price change
(i) must be unity. Second, the equilibrium real wage term in the wage
equation and standard productivity growth in the price equation must be
equal =0).Third, the coefficient on standard unit labor cost in the
price equation must be unity (y, == l).18Fourth, the level and rate of
change of the output ratio, as well as every supply shift variable, must also
be equal to zero == z=0).Correspondingly (11) lays out those
events that can cause the inflation rate to accelerate, including an excess of
over a1, a level of the log of the output ratio above zero, a positive
rate of growth of the output ratio, and any adverse supply shock. Clearly
Q =0(i.e., Q =Q),represents the "natural rate of output" only if all
of the other conditions stated in the previous sentence are valid. If there30
is, for instance, an adverse supply shift (z >0), inflation can accelerate
even if —0.In other words an excess of over or a positive
realization of any z variable, pushes the "constant inflation" level of
output below the value of from whith is calculated. Thus the frame-
work of equation (11) has the potential of explaining why inflation acceler-
ated during the 1970s, despite the fact that the measure of summarized in
Table 1 wasnegativeon average during the decade.
Twoadditionalelements could be introduced.into the model of (8) and
(9), but are not pursued here to simplify the paper. First, the workings of
inertia in (8) could take the form of a dependence of wages on lagged wages
rather than lagged prices. In this case lagged wages would enter (10), and
thus a wage equation as well as a price equation would have to be estimated
in order to close the model. Second, wages could depend on consumer prices,
which differ from the value—added prices determined by (9), since the former
include imports. Such a specification would bring the difference between
consumer and va.ue—added prices into (10) as an additional variable. During
the decade of the 1970s, this difference is highly correlated with the food—
energy supply shift variable introduced below, so that our reduced—form
implicitly captures most of the impact of consumer prices on wages.
There is one rather subtle obstacle to the estimation of (11). We
would expect the rate of inflation to respond positively to the speed of
economic expansion, Butthere are two reasons why Pt and may have a
negative correlation that results in a downward bias in the coefficient
One reason is measurement error; since nominal GNP and prices are measured
independently, with real GNP as a residual, any error in the measurement31
of prices introduces an opposite movement in Second,for any given
growth rate of nominal GNP, a supply shock (z >0)raises Pt and reduces
q; any errors in measurement of the variables may introduce a spurious
negative correlation between Pt and Toavoid this problem we use the
identity Pt +q=y,where the latter variable stands for the excess of
nominal GNP growth over the growth in natural real GNP =
Whenthis identity is substituted for in (11), we cart factor out p and
obtain our final estimating equation:
(12) =
11-2OPt1
l2t + lt—l + yo(x_) + y3z +
where for convenience we assume
(12) is the final form for which we provide estimates in this section
of the paper. All that remains is to specify the productivity term (X —
andthe exact variables to represent the supply shock terms (zr). We note
that the long—run equilibrium properties of (12) differ slightly from those
of (11). If the sum of coefficients on lagged prices in (11) is unity
1), then in (12) it will be the sum of the coefficients on lagged
prices and on y that equal unity.
Ste pwise Introduction of IndividualI7ariabl.es
The basic inflation equation to be examined, analyzed, and simulated in the32
rest of this paper contains a number of variables, some of which are uncon-
ventional. To make our approach easier to understand, we present in Table 4
eight equations hich introduce the explanatory variables one at a time. Our
explanation of the method of construction of each variable accompanies the
discussion of the equation where that variable is introduced.
1. lagged Inflation. Column (1) of Table 4 presents an extremely
simple equation in which the inflation rate is explained only by its own
lagged values. The dependent variable and sample period are identical to
Tables 2 and 3, and the only difference between this equation and the ARIMA
equation in column (1) of Table 2 is the method of specifying the lag dis-
tribution. Here in Table 4 the coefficient of 1.04 is not a single coefficient
for a single lagged dependent variable, but rather the sum of 24 lag co-
efficients constrained to lie along a fourth degree polynomial. Comparing
the first columns of Table 2 and Table 4, we note that the latter has a
slightly lower standard error, indicating that the flexibility provided by
the polynomial distributed lag (PDL) technique provides enough of an improve-
ment of fit to offset the extra degrees of freedom required.
2.. iiiaonControlDummies. Tables 2 and 3 presented estimates of
Nixon controls effects using dummy variables for several alternative time
periods. Here we choose 197l—Q3 through l972:Q4 for the Tton" effect and
l974:Q2 through l975:Ql for the uoffl effect, both because these periods
seemed to provide the best fit in our preliminary research, and because the
same periods were used in earlier papers. Column (2) suggests that dummy
variables for these periods added to the pure autoregression of column (1)
have insignificant coefficients. This result contrasts with the significant































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes to Table 4
a.The dependent variable is the same as that in Table 3. The numbers
in parentheses are t statistics.
b. The coefficient shown is the sum of 24 distributed lag coefficients
constrained to lie alongfourth degree polynomial withazero end—point
constraint.
a. The dummy variables are constrained to addup to 4.0 (reflecting
the conversion of quarterly changes of all variables to annual rates).
Thus the dummy is equal to 2/3 for the six quarters listed, and the
"off" dummy is equal to 1,0 for the four quarters listed,
d. The coefficient shown is the sum of a set of unconstrained
coefficients on the current and lagged values, with four lags included
on lines 7 9, and 10, and two lags included on line 8.
All regressions contain an insignificant constant. -35
may be explained by the ability of the PDL distribution to twist around
enough to explain partially the slowdown of inflation of 1972 and accelera-
tion of 1974.19
3. TheLagged Output Ratio Column (3) adds the lagged
outputratio, one of the two "demand" variables that appear in equation (12).
This traditionalPhillips curve variable is highly significant; its coefficient
of 0.31 indicates that a one percentage point excess of actual real GNP
above natural real GNP causes an acceleration of inflation of 0.31 percentage
points at an annual rate per quarter. The total acceleration over the first
year of such an excess would be greater than 0.31 percentage points, because
after the first quarter the additional inflation would begin to feed through
the lagged dependent variable. Two important features of column (3) are
the jump in the size and significance of the Nixon control dummies, and the
increase in the sum of coefficients on the lagged dependent variable. The
former reflects the negative correlation of and the inflation rate in
the early 1970s (see Table 1), i.e., in column (3) the "computer cannot under-
stand" why inflation accelerated in 1974 when was dropping and thus
assigns a positive and significant dummy to the controls "off" variable that
is in effect at the same time. The latter shift results from the failure of
inflation to slow down in the 1970—71 recession, so that the lagged dependent
variable must be assigned a greater role when the variable (which fell
from 1969 to 1970—71) is introduced.
4.Adjusted Nominal GNP Growth (y). The nominal GNP growth
variable that appears in equation (12)is defined net of natural real GNP
growth. The same natural real GNP variable is used in level form todefine36
the output ratio and in growth—rate form to adjust the officially
measured rate of nominal CNP groith. The introduction ofy in column (4)
further increases the size of the Nixon control dummy cOefficientswithout
having any impact on the theoretical coefficient, which is now measured
as the sum of the coefficients displayed on line 1 and line 5. Note that a
slowdown in the trend growth rate of productivity will reduce natural real
GNP growth and raisey, so that this variable represents the combined ef-
fects of demand stimulation and long—run productivity growth.
5.RelativePricesofFoodand Energy Thefirst of the supply
shockvariables to be introduced in Table 4 is the contribution to inflation
of changes in the relative prices of food and energy. This effect is measured
bythe difference between the rate of change of the private business deflator
and that of an alternative deflator that attempts to "strip out" the impact
of the changing relative prices of food and energy.20 While this variable is
significant and makes a contribution to the fit of the equation without caus-
ing appreciable changes in the size of the other coefficients, its own co-
efficient seems surprisingly low. This probably reflects errors in the
measurement of the true food—energy contribution; our variable exhibits sub-
stantial jumps from quarter to quarter that may miss the actual timing of the
impact of food and energy prices. Also our dependent variable in this paper
is the fixed—weight CNP deflator, which differs both in coverage and in weight-
ing from the implicit deflator for private business used to construct the
food—energy variable.
6. Productivity Deviation. The second supply variable is the
deviation of the rate of growth of nonfarm labor productivity from its trend,37
estimated in a regression of the quarterly growth rate of nonfarm productivity
for 1954—80 that contains a constant and a single trend beginning in 1970.
This trend falls from a growth rate of about 2.5 percent to zero over the
1970—80 decade, and a distributed lag of residuals from the productivity
equation is entered in line (6) into the inflation equation. The justification
for the appearance of this variable stems from our inability to observe the
productivity variable that firms actually use in adjusting labor costs whert
making their pricing decisions. Let us imagine that the productivity
variable in the wage equation (x)isa constant representing a straight time
trend, t, whereas the "standard" productivity variable in the price equation
is a weighted average of the actual growth rate of productivity
and another constant trend (t):
(13)
(14) =p(p)+ (1—)t,2l
so that the productivity variable that appears in equation (12) becomes:
(15) =
The (t —t)termbecomes absorbed in the constant of the inflation equation w p
and is indistinguishable from the other possible source of a non—zero constant
term, the misrneasurement of the level of natural real GNP.
The introduction of the productivity deviation variable in column (6)
of Table 4 yields a highly significant estimate of .i=0.43, indicating that
firms base their pricing decisions on a productivity variable that combines
actual productivity with a 43 percent weight and a time trend with a 57 percent38
weight. Coefficients on several other variables change inresponse to the
introduction of the productivity deviation. The Nixon cOntrolseffect becomes
substantially smaller, because the rapid growth of productivity in 1972and
the decline in productivity in 1974 both help to explainwhy inflation was
relatively low in 1972 and high in 1974, thus requiring less of a contributjor
z
from the controls dummies. The other major changes are a doubling inthe co-
efficient on y and a further reduction in the sum of coefficientson the
lagged dependent variable.22
7. Effective Exchzng Rate. The depreciation of the dollarduring
the 1970s has not been included as an explanatory variable inprevious studies,
mainly because it has been difficult to find a statistically significant ef-
fect for changes in the exchange rate. We believe that this previous insig-
nificance of the exchange rate stems from the impact of the Nixon controls
in delaying the adjustment of U. S. domestic prices to the dollardepreciation
that occurred in two stages between 1971 and 1973. We have createda new
variable which is equal to the actual change in the effective exchangerate of
the dollar (i.e., the number of units of a market basket offoreign currencies
that the dollar can buy each quarter) starting in l974:Q3, but which isset
equal to zero before 1974 and thus forces the entire 16 percent decline in the
effective exchange rate that occurred between 1971:Q3 and l974:Q2 tooccur
in two quarters, l974:Ql and 1974:Q2. Column (7) of Table 4 indicates that
this new effective exchange rate variable is highly significant and substan-
tially weakens the Nixon controls "off" effect, in effect implying that the
delayed impact of dollar depreciation rather than the termination of controls
per e explains why inflation accelerated so much during 1974.39
8. Payroll Tax. Discussions of economic policy in the past five
years have devoted much attention to "self—inflicted wounds," whereby the
government has introduced policies that directly worsen the inflation rate.
One of these factors, changes in the effective social security tax rate, is
entered into our basic equation as a five—quarter unconstrained distributed
lag in column (8) of Table 4•23 A sum of coefficients of 1.00 on this variable
would indicate that all changes in the effective tax rate, which includes both
the employee and employer shares of the tax, are shifted forward into prices.
The coefficient of 0.43 in column (8) indicates a shifting effect that is
only partial but by no means negligible.
9. Effective Minimum Wage Rate. Another much—discussed "self—
inflicted wound" has been increases in the effective minimumwage rate,
defined as the ratio of the statutory minimum wage toaverage hourly earnings
in the nonf arm private economy. This variable, also entered as a five—
quarter unconstrained lag, has only a marginal inflationary impact in column
(8). The sum of coefficients of 0.02 means that the cumulative 8 percent in-
crease in the effective minimum wage rate during the four quarters of 1978 ac-
counted for an acceleration of inflation of about 0.16 percentage points. In
section IX below we examine the quantitative impact of the "self—inflicted
wounds" in accounting for the variance and overall acceleration of inflation
in the 1970s.
Conclusionto Section VI.
Thefinal equation presented in Table 4 has a standard error of 0.65,
little more than half of the standard error of thepure autoregression in
column (1) or of the pure ARIMA or money—only equations presented in Tables40
2 and 3. The fraction of the total variance of the dependentvariable that
remains unexplained drops from 16.4 percent in column (1) to 3.6percent in
column (8). Thus the more complete model substantially improvesour ability
to explain the behavior of the 1954—80 inflation rate.
VII. ESTIMATED IMPACT OF CONTROLS, PAY STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINES
Our methodological discussion in section III compared two methods of
estimating the effects of price controls and other types of government inter-
vention. Dummy variables, such as those included in Table. 4, have the advantage
that all of the available historical data can be included in equations that
are used to estimate their coefficients, and the disadvantage that they force
the effect of a particular intervention program to have a uniform impact each
quarter. The other alternative method, post—sample dynamic simulations,
has the advantage that arbitrary decisions regarding the timing of theprogram
can be avoided, and the disadvantage that the impact of important variables
that operate only in the post—sample period cannot be assessed. If these
left—out variable effects interact with the controls, then the post—sample
dynamic simulations can give quite different answers than the dummy variable
technique.
A method introduced by Blinder (1979) estimates an equation for the
entire sample period, taking advantage of all the data as in the dummy variable
technique, but instead of using dummy variables, constructs a new variable to
represent the impact of the controls that is equal to the fraction of the CPI
subject to price controls in each month, based on government records. The
Blinder approach has two advantages over the dummy variable technique. First,41
there is no need to make arbitrary decisions regarding timing, as must be
done in dating dummy variables, since the constructed variable contains its
own independent information on timing. Second, the controls are allowed to
have varying effects each quarter rather than the uniform effect imposed by
our "on" and "off" dummies. Below we shall examine the consequences of re-
placing our dunImy variables with the Blinder variables and compare the assess-
ment of the controls implied by the two techniques.
Evaluatinc' the NixonControls Period with Simulations and Dummy Variables
Table5 provides the information needed to compare alternative methods
of evaluating the quantitative impact of the Nixon controls program. Belot
in this section we shall also examine the implications of the same techniques
for an assessment of the Kennedy—Johnson guidelines and the Carter pay
standards. The basic inflation equation is presented iithreepairs. Each
of the three pairs is estimated for a different sample period, in every case
starting in 1954:Q2 and ending, respectively, in 197l:Q2, l977:Q4, and l980:Q2.
For each sample period the left column presents an unconstrained estimate,
and the right column presents a variant that constrains y (i.e., the sum of
the coefficients on y and on the lagged dependent variable) to be unity.
As in previous research we find that unity constraints are necessary for
equations to yield adequate post—sample simulations, since the unconstrained
versions tend to contain estimates of -thatexceed unity and thus make the
equations dynamically unstable. 2
Thefirst pair of columns in Table 5 presents unconstrained and con—
strained equations for the portion of the sample period ending in 1971:Q2,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes to Table 5
a. All variables are the same as in Table 4.The numbers in parentheses
are t statistics. No t statistics are shown for theconstrained equations,
since these are not calculated correctlyby standard regression programs.
b. The constraint is thaty, the sum of coefficients on adjusted
nominal GNP growth and lagged inflation, be 1.0;our iterative procedure
described in footnote 25 stopped just short ofconvergence (0.85 + 0.16 =1.01).
c. Cumulated errors are divided by 4 to make the estimatesof controls
effects commensurate with dummy variable coefficients.Columns (3), (4)
(5) and (6) report durmny variable coefficientson lines a and c and cumulated
regression residuals on line b. Columns (5) and (6)report cumulated
regression residuals on line d.43
in column (1) can be compared with the equivalent full—sample equation in
column (5), which duplicates the final column of Table 4. The main difference
in the shorter sample period is the extremely high sum of coefficients on the
lagged dependent variable; this phenomenon results from the failure of infla—
don to slow down in the 1969—70 recession in the face of a substantial decline
in the contribution to inflation of the and y variables. In the longer
sample period the sum of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable is
much closer to unity, in order to allow the equation to remain on track in
the 1970q.
As would be expected in an equation that is as dynamically unstable as
that in column (1), a post—sample dynamic simulation substantially over—
predicts the actual rate of inflation that occurred between 1971 and l980
Thus the negative simulation errors in 1971—73 have the misleading implication
that the controls had a major effect in holding down th inflation rate, while
the small positive errors in the 1974 "off" interval imply a very small re-
bound as compared with the estimate of "what would have happened otherwise."
We do not believe that these simulation results can be taken seriously in
light of the steadily growing drift of the simulated values away from the
actual values as the decade proceeds.
Column (2) constrains the coefficient to be unity, and this results in
a substantial deterioration in the standard error during the equation's sample
period, but a marked improvement in the ability of the post—sample dynamic
simulation to track the inflation rate during the 1970s.25 In contrast to the
cumulative overprediction rjf inflation of 4.32 percentage points between
l971:Q3 and l975:Q1 in column (1), inflation in column (2) for that interval
is now underpredicted by 2.29 percentage points, with the implication that44
the "off"effecthad a greater effect in raising prices than the "on"
effect had in lowering prices.
Why does this result differ from the dummy variable estimates of
column (6) of Table 5, where the cumulative "on" and "off" effects are about
the same size? The other coefficients in the constrained short—sample and
full—sample equations, columns (2) and (6), are amazingly close to each other,
with the exceptiot of the effective exchange rate, which does not appear in
the short—sample equation. The post—sample simulation in column (2), which
is given no information on the exchange rate, makes an underprediction error
in 1974 that confuses the true controls "off" effect with the unobserved
depreciation of the dollar, whereas the full—period equation in column (6)
has the extra information necessary to attribute separate effects to controls
and the exchange rate.
Below in the final section of the paper we run dynamic simulations that
allow us to assess the separate impact of each explanatory variable to the
inflation that occurred between 1970—80; those results indicate that the
1970—80 depreciation of the dollar accounted for a cumulative extra increase
in the price level of 2.7 percentage points between 1978:Q1 and 1980:Q2, as
opposed to a hypothetical alternative of fixed exchange rates throughout the
decade. That figure can be compared to the 4.0 percentage point cumulative
underprediction of inflation for the same interval in the constrained short—
period equation in column (2) that does not include the exchange rate. The
remaining portion of the cumulative 1978—80 simulation error in column (2)
that is not due to the omission of the foreign exchange variable is only 1.4
percentage points, and this seems remarkably small for an equation that is
being asked to forecast inflation between seven and nine years after the end
of its sample period. 2645
TheCarter Paj Standards and Other Events During 1978_SO
Didthe Carter pay standards, which were introduced in the fourth
quarter of 1978, have any impact on the inflation rate? This question can be
assessed, as in the case of the Nixon controls, either by use of the post—
sample simulation or dummy variable technique. An equation estimated to the
end of 1977 is used for post—sample dynamic simulations and is displayed in
columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 in both unconstrained and constrained form.
The coefficients are very close to those in the full—period equations dis-
played in columns (5) and (6) and because of this similarity we would not
expect the 1954—77 equations to go seriously astray in post—sample simulations
of the 1978—80 interval.
The cumulative 19.78—80 simulation errors fOr the unconstrained and con-
strained versions are, respectively, —1.32 and —0.06 percentage points.
Thus the unconstrained version, with its implied dynamic instability
(y0 =1.10),overpredicts 1979—80 inflation at about a 0.5 percent annual
rate, whereas the constrained version is almost exactly on track. Within
the five quarters when the first phase of thepay standards was in effect,
l978:Q4—1979:Q4, the respective cumulative errors are —0.86 and —0.18 per-
centage points. In light of the dynamic instability of the unconstrained
equation, the implication of the constraine.d equation——that the pay standards
had virtually no impact on the inflation rate——seems more reliable.
The alternative method of evaluating the Carterpay standards is to
introduce one or more dummy variables for theperiod during which they were
in effect. We have taken our "basic equation" fromTable 4, column (8) and
Table 5, column (5), and have introduced twodummy variables for the periods46
1978:Q4—1979:Q4 and 1980:Ql—l980:Q2, respectively. The first dummy can be
interpreted as the effect on inflation of the initial year of the pay stan-
dards, while the second dummy can be interpreted either as the effect of the
second phase of the pay standards or of the "postcontrols rebound" following
the first stage. The resulting coefficients and t statistics are:
Carter dummy I (1978:Q4—1979:Q4)—0.67 (—1.08)
Carter dummy II (1980:Ql—1980:Q2)0.05 C0.18)
Both variables are insignificantly different from zero, so that the dummy
variable technique supports the post—sample simulation technique in assessing
the pay standards as having no impact. Both the post—sample simulations and
dummy variables suggest that there was nothing unusual about the inflation
experience between late 1978 and mid 1980, and that the other variables in
the equation are capable of tracking the data.
Kennedy-Johnson GuideZines
Another episode of government intervention occurred during the Kennedy
and Johnson administration, when there were quasi—voluntary guidelInes
established for wage increases. These guidelines, first mentioned in the
1962 Economic Report of the President, are generally assumed to have been in
effect between early 1963 and mid—1966, when the pressure of excess demand
and the victory of the airline machinists union in obtaining a large wage
increase led the Administration to abandon the program. Some investigators,
e.g., Perry (l980) have found that the guidelines indeed did hold down wage
increases. Because the guidelines occurred relatively early in our sample
period, we do not have sufficient degrees of freedom available to estimate an
equation ending in 1962 for the purpose of post—sample dynamic simulations,47
and we are forced to rely on the
dummy variible technique as were other in—
vestigators who assessed the guidelines in the past.
Our guidelines "on" variable is assumed to be in effectbetween 1963:Ql—
1965:Q4.27 Despite the substantial evidence presented above andelsewhere
that the Nixon controls had a substantial post—control "rebound"effect,
previous studies have not examined the possibility of a post—guidelines
rebound. Thus we enter a separate dummy variable for thethree—year period
beginning in l966:Ql to assess the possibility that part of the 1966—68
acceleration in the inflation rate was due to the end of theguidelines
rather than a general state of excess demand in theeconomy. When these
dummy variables are included in our basic unconstrained inflation equation,
the resulting coefficients and t statistics are:
Guidelines dummy I (1963:Ql—1965:Q4) 0.01 (0.01)
Guidelines dummy II (l966:Ql—1968:Q4)0.60 (0.61)
In light of the verdict of these coefficients that the guidelinesprogram
had no significant effect on inflation, two questions remain.First, how does
the basic equation explain the relatively low 1.4average annual percentage
rate of inflation during 1963—65 in light of the acceleration of nominal
demand growth and increase in the output ratio that occurredduring that
interval? The degree of demand stimulation was minor as measuredby our
variables. did not exceed zero until mid—1964 and prior to that time acted
to decelerate the inflation rate. Adjusted annual nominal GNP growth
was at the relatively modest rate of 3.7 percent. The positive influence of
the excess of over the inherited past rate of inflation 'ias almost completely48
offset, at least until 1965, by the negative influence on inflation of rapid
productivity growth.
A second question about the guidelines era concerns the relation of
prices to wages. If the guidelines had a significant effect in holding down
the rate of change of wages, as the work of Perry and others implies, but had
no effect on the rate of price change, as the results in this section imply,
then an important side effect of the guidelines policy was to create a boom
in the profits share. This is exactly the outcome that labor unions fear
will occur when wage guidelines are proposed, and the guidelines era with its
accompanying stock market boom may be looked upon as a golden age of state—
supported capitalism. The interpretation that the guidelines policy tem-
porarily reduced the share of labor income in GNP may also help to explain the
anomalous rise in that share in the late l960s; the shift in shares may have
been the result of a guidelines impact followed by a post—guidelines rebound.
In the absence of the guidelines and Nixon controls, the step—like increase
in the share of employee compensation observed in the late l960s and early
l970s might otherwise have looked more like a time trend.
The BlinderTechniquefor the Assessment of the Nixon Controls Period
As discussed above, the Blinder technique that develops an independent
explanatory variable for the Nixon controls period seems superior in principle
to either the post—sample simulation or the dummy variable techniques. But
Blinder's method is not available to assess the impact of the Kennedy—Johnson
guidelines, the Carter pay standards, or other programs in pre—1954 history
or in the future. Thus our main question in this section is whether the con-
clusions reached using the Blinder technique contradict or support our49
preferred estimates, that is those using dummy variables within the constrained
version of the bai.c equation in Table 5, column (6).
Since a detailed presentation is available in Blinder (1979), we present
here only the minimum explanation required to provide an understanding of our
comparisons. From government data Blinder constructed a monthly time—series
variable for the interval between August 1971 and May 1974, showing the
fraction of items in the CPI subject to the price controls in each month.
This variable, 5, is equal to zero before and after the controls interval and
reaches a maximum of 0.91 in Phase I during the autumn of 1971. In addition
to including this variable in his inflation equation, Blinder also defines a






Thedetails of Blinder's study differ radically from ours. His dependent
variable is the change in the CPI. He fits a price mark—up equation with the
wage rate as an explanatory variable rather than a reduced—form equation for
inflation. He adjusts for food and energy inflation by subtracting these
components from the dependent variable. His demand effect is represented by
the inventory—sales ratio, and he does not include our exchange rate, produc-
tivity, social security tax, or minimum wage variables. Since the first two
of these left—out variables explain a substantial portion of the 1974 inflation
in our basic equation, it is not surprising that Blinder's results yield an
"off" effect that substantially exceeds the controls "on" effect. This50
evaluation is performed by comparing two within—sample simulations,one that
sets and C equal to their actual values, and an alternative simulation
that sets both equal to zero.
Although Blinder's review of earlier literature criticizes studies that
restrict dummy variables to alter the constant rather than interacting with
every explanatory variable, he discovers that there are insufficient degrees
of freedom within the controls period to allow any interaction effects at
all. Thus his variable is introduced linearly, and his C variable is
allowed to enter as a linear distributed lag to allow for delays in the catch-
up process. We have exactly duplicated his method within our specification of
the inflation process, replacing our Nixon controls "on" and "off" dummy
variables with quarterly averages of and C, where the former enters only
as a current variable, while the latter enters both as a current variable and
as an unconstrained la on four past values. The sampl period is the same as
in our basic equations, 1954:Q2 through 1980:Q2. As in all of our equations,
the lagged dependent variable is adjusted to subtract out the estimated impact
of the controls variables. This improves the fit and boosts the estimated
impact of controls with the Blinder variables, just as in our basic equations.
Because in the Blinder version of our equations the non—controls variables
have coefficients that are almost identical to those in Table 5, we save
space here by omitting a detailed tabular presentation. The coefficients of
the Blinder variables are significant but are hard to interpret by themselves,
so we follow Blinder below by evaluating the estimated impact of the controls
program in dynamic simulations. The following is a comparison of the
standard errors of the alternative equations.51
=1
No Constraint Constraint
Table 5, columns (5) and (6) .646 .664
Alternative timing of "off" dummy .638 .651
Blinder versions .649 .660
Three pairs of equations are presented, both unconstrained and constrained.
The first pair——copied from Table 5——fits about as well as the Blinder versions,
i.e., the Blinder variables add sufficient explanatory power to balance the
extra degrees of freedom required without improving the equation's standard
error. An inspection of the Blinder simulation results indicates that the
estimated timing pattern of the controls is almost identical to that of our
dummy variables, except that the "off" effect occurs one quarter later. When
our "off" dummy is retimed to apply to 1974:Q3 through 1975:Q2, the standard
error drops well below that of the Blinder versions, as.shown by the middle
pair above.
Several aspects of our basic constrained equation and the Blinder con-
strained version are illustrated in Figure 1. The upper frame compares the
actual rate of inflation, shown by a solid line, with a dashed line showing
the fitted value of a dynamdc simulation of our basic constrained equation
from Table 5, column (6). The dotted line shows an alternative dynamic
simulation of the same equation with the controls dummies set to zero. The
shaded areas indicate the estimated impact of the controls on the inflation
rate. It is interesting to note that the dotted line suggests that most of
the acceleration of inflation in 1973—74 is attributed to factors other than
the termination of controls.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Blinder's for the displacement of the price level caused by the controls.
The solid line shows that the cumulative downward displacement of the price
level implied by the controls "on" dummy coefficient in the constrained
version is —1.29 percentage points, i.e., from a base index value of 100 in
l971:Q2 to 98.71 in 1972:Q3. The simulation of the constrained Blinder
version with and without the controls variables indicates a maximum downward
displacement of 1.48 points, i.e., from 100 to 98.52. The Blinder"off"
effect eliminates slightly less than all of the "on" effect, raising the
price level to 99.87 percent of its no—controls value, whereas our "off"
dummy coefficient of 1.45 raises the price level to 100.16 percent of its
no—controls value.
In short, the Blinder technique——despite the extra research required
for construction of the new variable and its lack.of applicability to other
episodes of government intervention——provides neither abetter fit nor an
evaluation of the Nixon controls that differs from our simple dummy variable
approach. It suggests only a single minor improvement in our basic equation,
a shift in timing by one quarter of the Nixon "off." dummy variable.
VIII. A DECOMPOSITION OF THE INFLATION OF THE l970s
DecompositionMethodology
Theplot of actual and fitted values in Figure 1 suggests that our basic
equation provides an extremely tight fit of the highly variable inflation rate
of the past decade. In fact the root—mean squared error in the dynamic
simulation is just 0.53 percentage point.s at an annual rate, less than the
standard error of our best equation estimated to the less turbulent 1954—7154
period. Since this dynamic simulation is based on actual values ofexplana-
tory variables, an interesting decomposition of inflation can be created when
the explanatory variables one—by—one are set equal to alternative hypothetical
values.
Inflation in the first quarter of 1971 was5.0percent as measured by
our dependent variable, the fixed—weight GNPdeflator.Thus we decided to
create a hypothetical path for each explanatory variable that would have
allowed the inflation rate to settle down to a 5.0 percent long—runequili-
brium path. All thez variables listed in lines 6 through 10 of Table 5,
as well as the Nixon control dummy variables, must be set equal tozero,
and the paths of y and must be specified as well. Obviously an assumed
value of adjusted nominal GNPgrowthof five percent is required to produce
a long—run equilibrium inflation path of 5 percent. As for the log of
the output ratio, a value of zero would appear to be required. However, the
constrained equation contains a positive and significant constant term,
indicating that inflation will accelerate when =0.This constant term
could indicate either that our measure of natural real GNP isoverstated, and
thus is understated, or it could at least partly be caused by a value of
real wage aspirations (t) in excess of the trend productivity variable that
appears in the structural price equation above (t). Since t andt are not
observed, our steady—inflation simulation must set —1.35 percent.
The details of the decomposition are presented in Table 6. The first





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dynamic simulation of the basic constrained equation that starts in l970:Q4.
The hypothetical alternative simulation of a path of the explanatory variables
compatible with a steady inflation of 5.0 percent is shown in line A3. The
quarters shown are chosen to mark peaks and troughs of inflation during the
past decade. The remaining section of the Table corioares successive simula-
tions that make the transition between lines A.3 and 1.2 occur one variable
at a time. For instance, line B.l shows the difference in the estimated
change in the inflation rate between l971:Ql and l972:Q3 in two simulations,
the one presented on line A..3 that is compatible with 5 percent steady infla-
tion, and a second that adds the Nixon control dummy variables multiplied by
their estimated coefficients. Then line B.2 adds in the actual value of
in place of the assumed value of —1.4, runs another dynamic simulation,
and calculates the different in the fitted values. Finally, after converting
step—by—step to the actual values of all explanatory vaiab1es, we obtain the
dynamic simulation presented on line A.2. Thus the sum of lines B.l through
B.9, displayed in line B.10, equals the change between the specified quarters
in the dynamic simulation shown on line A.2.28
DecompositionResults
Theexplanation of the inflation of the past decade laid out in section
B of Table 6 is an intriguing one. Several factors are singled out to ex—
plain the acceleration of inflation that occurred during 1972—74 and again
during 1976—80, as well as the sharp 1974—76 deceleration. The right—hand
column provides an overall explanation of the acceleration of inflation
between the beginning and end of the decade.
The simulated values explain only about three—quarters of the slowdown57
in the rate of inflation between 1971:Q1 and l972:Q3. Of this, the most
important causes are the Nixon controls and the rapid growth of productivity
relative to trend. The 1972:Q3 through 1974:Q4 acceleration of inflation is
explained by the termination of controls, the 1974 decline in productivity,
the cumulated dollar depreciation between 1971 and 1974, and the lagged
effects of the 1973 increase in the social security tax and of the 1974 in-
crease in the minimum wage rate. Surprisingly, increases in food and energy
prices explain nothing, because their impact operates without a lag and ac-
cording to our variable has been completed by 1974:Q4.
Only a small part of the slowdown of inflation between 1974:Q4 and
1976:Q2 can be explained by the recession itself, that is, the slump in
pt—F Instead, most of the slowddwn is accounted for by a reversal of the
elements that caused the temporary acceleration in 1974——especially the end of
thecontrols termination effect, the shift from negative to positive pro—
ductivity growth, and the appreciation of the dollar. Finally, the accelera-
tion of inflation between l976:Q2 and l980:Q1 has a multiplicity of causes,
including rapid nominal CNP growth and the slowdown in natural real ON?
growth (the difference between which equals the explosion of energy
prices; the slump in productivity growth, the 1978—79 depreciation of the
U. S. dollar, and the increase in the effective social security tax rate.
Whydidinflation accelerate so far above 5 percent during the period
between 1971 and 1980? The four most significant factors over the decade
taken as a whole were food and energy prices, the productivity slowdown,
thedepreciation of the dollar, and the social security tax increases. The
contribution of nominal GNP growth is surprisingly small, partly because the58
quarter chosen to begin the simulation already had a large growth rate of
nominal CNP.2 These results help to suggest why economic policyrnakers have
been forced in 1980 to foster restrictive demand growth and deliberately to
induce a recession. Because so many adverse supply elements have caused in-
flation to accelerate over the past few years, demand restriction seems the
only available anti—inflationary policy. Of the major contributors to the
acceleration of inflation in the 1970s, only the social security tax is
under the immediate control of policymakers in Washington.
Qua lificators
The decomposition in Table 6 is obviously sensitive to the size of the
estimated coefficients in the basic equation and would change if those co-
efficients were to change. Thus it is reassuring to turn back to Table 5 and
scan the constrained versions of the equations estimated for three alternative
sample periods in columns (2), (4) and (6). With the exception of the effec-
tive exchange rate, which does not appear in the short—period equation estimated
for 1954—71, the coefficients are surprisingly stable. This indicates that a
decomposition very similar to that of Table 6 would be produced by the
1954—71 equation, if allowance were made for an exchange rate effect.
In any multivariate analysis of economic time series, wemay ask whether
a particular explanatory variable has a consistent impact throughout the sample
period or whether its coefficient is heavily influenced by a particular year
or quarter. One technique available for this assessment is the estimation of
alternative sample periods that "roll forward" severalyears at a time. We
have reestimated our basic unconstrained equation for twelveyear "rolling"
sample periods, e.g., 1954—66, 1956—68, etc. Most of the coefficients appear59
appear to be quite stable and are statistically significant throughout,in-
cluding those of the output ratio, adjusted nominal GN? growth, food and
energy prices, and the productivity deviation. The coefficient onthe social
security tax varies between about 0.25 and 0.5, depending on the sample period
chosen. This is not surprising, since there were long periods when the tax
rate did not chang.e appreciably. The least robust variable is the minimum
wage rate, which seems to obtain most of its significance from the year 1956,
when the minimum wage rate jumped from $0.75 to $1.00.
Does the foreign exchange rate have an impact throughout the 1974—80
period, or is it just acting as a dummy variable for the first half of 1974?
We compared two dynamic simulations of our basic constrained equation, one with
the actual values of effective exchange rate changes and another with those
changes set equal to zero except for 1974:Ql and 1974:Q2. The first simula-
tion has a much better ability to fit the data for the late l970s, with a
decline in the root—mean—squared simulation error from 0.627 to 0.415 for the
interval 1976:Q3 through 1978:Q2, and from 0.791 to 0.562 for the interval
l978:Q3 through 1980:Q2. In addition to their contribution in 1974, changes
in the exchange rate help to explain why the inflation rate was so iowin
early 1976 and why it accelerated in early 1979.
The food and energy variable deserves further scrutiny. One surprising
feature of Table 5 is that its coefficient is actually larger before 1971
than afterwards, indicating that fluctuations in those relative prices made a
contribution to the explanation of inflation before 1971 that has been
neglected in previous research. Another puzzle is the small size of the
coefficient, only 0.36 in the full—period constrained equation. We have ex-
perimented with another food and energy variable which we call FAE, the direct60
contribution to the consumption deflator of changes in the relative prices of
food and energy. It performs almost as well in our basic equation as the
variable used in Tables 4 and 5, which we call BDP, and it has about the same
coefficient. We have also experimented with alternative dependent variables,
including the implicit deflator for business product and the implicit deflator
for personal consumption expenditures. When the former dependent variable is
used, the coefficients on both FAE and BDP are similar to those in our basic
equations, about 0.3. When the latter is used, the coefficient on both FAE and
BDP rises to about 0.55, and to about 0.9 when lagged values are included. We
conclude that changes in the relative prices of food and energy are fully
passed into consumer prices but not into GNP prices, due partly to the ex-
clusion of import prices from the latter and due partly to the inability of
our BDP series to capture the precise timing of the adjustment necessary to
remove the impact of imported oil prices.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
An adequate explanation of both the variance and overall acceleration
of inflation in the 1970s requires a model that includes effects of aggregate
demand, government intervention, external supply shocks, and inertia in the
adjustment of prices. Our basic reduced—form inflation equation relies on the
contribution of two variables for its aggregate demand effect, the lagged
level of the output ratio and the change in nominal GNP adjusted for changes in
natural real CNP. Three forms of government intervention influence inflation,
the Nixon—era controls, changes in the effective social security tax rate and
effective minimum wage. External supply shocks include changes in the relative
prices of food and energy, the influence of changes in the effective exchange61
rate of the dollar, and deviations of productivity from trend. Finally,
inertia is represented by the influence of lagged inflation on the current
inflation rate. This classification of variables is partly arbitrary, since
the relative price of food and energy depends partly on government policies;
the foreign exchange rate responds both to domestic demand management as well
as to external events; and productivity deviations also respond both to demand
management and external events.
Because changes in demand policy influence not only the growth rate
of nominal GNP and the lagged output ratio but also the effective foreign
exchange rate and the productivity deviation, the inflation equation developed
in this paper cannot yet be used to compute policy simulations that show
the impact on inflation of alternative demand management policies. Further
research will be necessary to produce auxiliary equations relating the
exchange rate and productivity deviation to output and prices before such
research on alternative demand strategies can be undertaken.
Instead, the central focus of this paper has been on the interaction
of the estimated impact of the Nixon—era controls with the inclusion or
exclusion of important demand and supply factors. Previous studies have
estimated substantial effects of the controls in holding down inflation in
1972 and causing inflation to accelerate in 1974, and in many cases have
found that the implied impact of the removal of controls in raising inflation
in 1974 was greater than the initial impact of the controls in holding down
inflation in 1972. Several of the variables that play an important role in
our basic equation, especially the productivity deviation and exchange rate,
help to explain the actual inflation performance of 1972 and 1974 and thus
assign a smaller role to the Nixon controls. In this sense part of the impact62
of the Nixon controls in some previous studies confound the actual influence
of the controls and the influence of left—out variables.
We have presented detailed results of alternative models and methods for
estimating the impact of episodes of government intervention, including the
Nixon controls, Kennedy—Johnson guidelines, and Carter pay standards. We
conclude that ARIMA and money—only models are inadequate for this kind of
research because they omit many variables that play an important role in the
inflation process, and therefore they yield biased estimates of intervention
effects. Three different methods are used to assess the impact of the Nixon—era
controls within the context of our basic reduced—form inflation equation.
Post—sample dynamic simulations of equations estimated to the pre—controls
period are misleading unless the equations are constrained to be dynamically
stable. Simulations of such constrained equations tend to underpredict
inflation in 1974 more than they overpredict inflation in 1972, partly be-
cause there was no role of the effective exchange rate before 1971. The
second technique, the inclusion of dummy variables for the imposition and
removal of the controls, has the advantage of using all of the information
available in the full sample period, including that on the impact of the
effective exchange rate. Dummy variables indicate that the Nixon controls
held down the price level by about 1.3 percent between mid—1971 and late 1972,
and then allowed a rebound of about 1.4 percent to occur in 1974 and early
1975. A third technique, introduced by Alan Blinder, replaces the dummy
variables with a variable that measures the fraction of prices that were
actually controlled each quarter. Although this variable seems conceptually
superior, it does not alter the conclusions of the dummy variable technique,
yielding almost exactly the same standard error of estimate and the same
estimated magnitude and timing of the impact of controls on the price level.63
The model developed here can be used to answer the basic questions posed
at the beginning of the paper. Why was inflation so variable between 1971
and 1980? And why did inflation accelerate from 5 percent in early 1971 to
10 percent in early 1980? Our basic equation explains the high variance of
inflation mainly as a result of swings in the effect of Nixon controls, the
deviation of productivity from trend, the relative prices of food and energy,
and the effective exchange rate, with an additional minor contribution made by
the aggregate demand variables and by social security tax changes. The overall
acceleration of inflation during the past decade is explained by the adverse
contribution of most of the variables. Only the output ratio, Nixon controls,
and minimum wage made no contribution to the excess of 1980 over 1971 infla—
tion. The paper also concludes that the 1978—79 Carterpay standards had no
effect at all on the inflation rate, just as the Kennedy—Johnson guidelines
made no impact during the 1963—65 period (although in both caseswage growth
and the distribution of income may have been altered.
The conclusions of the paper send a mixed message to policymakers in
Washington. On the one hand, much of the acceleration of inflation in recent
years has been caused by factors, especially food and energy prices and the
productivity slowdown, over which domestic policymakers have little control in
the short run. On the other hand, there seems to be substantial potential for
achieving a deceleration of inflation. Restrictive demand policies have a
strong impact on inflation, working not only through the output ratio and
nominal GNP growth variables, but also through the indirect impact of demand
man,agement policy on inflation through the effective exchange rate. Andthe
relatively large coefficients on the social security tax suggest some anti—
inflationary potential for a tax substitution. But direct intervention in64
the inflation process is strongly condemned by theresults; the guidelines and
Carter pay standards had no effect at all oninflation, while the Nixon—era
controls had only a temporary impact that destabilized boththe inflation rate
and the level of real output.65
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FOOTNOTES
1.The introduction of these additional explanatory elements is not pure
hindsight; all but the dollar depreciation, food—energy effects, and
the minimum wage were present in earlier papers, e.g., Gordon (1971)
(1972).
2. See especially Barro (1978) and Barro—Rush (1980).
3.A sequel to this paper, to be presented in November 1980 to the Brook—
ings Conference on Labor Market Tightness and Inflation, will explore
the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications of the
demand side, e.g., the effects of unemployment variables compared with
those of the output ratiO.
4.We also assess the effects of changes in the relative prices of food
and energy on the personal consumption deflator.
5. The source of the natural real GNP series is Perloff and Wachter (.1979).
6. See Gordon (1977), Table 3 on pp. 266—7 and the discussion on p. 279.
7.Most published wage equations enter prices only in lagged form,
but many published price equations (including Gordon 1971, 1975, and
1977) include the current wage rate.
8. Inflation equations back to 1892arepresented for annual data in
Gordon (l980a) and for quarterly data in Gordon (1980b). The choice
of 1954:Q2 rather than l954:Ql has been made in papers extending back
to Gordon (1971) and reflects an inexplicable jump in the price level
in l954:Ql that has a substantial impact on several coefficients.
9. An exception is the ingenious controls impact variable constructed
by Blinder and Newton (1978) and Blinder (1979). This variable is
discussed and tested below.68
10. Pencavel (1980) obtains substantially differentconclusions regarding
the efficacy of past incomes policies when hefirst constrains four
programs to have the same effect and then allows each to havea
different effect.
11. This ambiguity is evident in the work ofPerry, who in a recent paper
(1980) chose l964:Ql—1965:Q4 as the dates for hisguideline dummy,
but in early papers had extended thedummy between 1963 and mid—1966.
12.If x =(l_B)dx then Xis said to be an integrated process of
order d whose uuivariate representation isan ARIMA (autoregressive
integrated moving average) model.
13. In the notation (p,d,q) thep term is the number of autoregressive
parameters, the d term is the degree of differencing, and theq term
is the number of moving averageparameters.
14. The inflation rate is scaledthroughout this paper as an annual rate.
15. The Q statistic, analogous to theDurbin—Watson statistic, is a measure
of the degree to which the residualsequence is observed to depart
from serial independence.
16. In principle, more precise estimates of allparameters could be ob-
tained by simultaneous estimation of 6 and thetwo regression coefficients.
In practice, little refinement isapt to arise from adding 15 observa-
tions to the 90 used to estimate 0, so thecomputational simplicity of
the two step procedure is favored.
17. The closest to a puremoney—causes—price model is presented by Barro
and Rush (1980, Table 2.2, columns 4 and 5).Here the price level is ex-
plained by the current level of money (in logs),a distributed lag of past69
money 'surprises," the current share of government spending in real GNP,
and a time trend (an interest rate term is insignificant). The money
surprises, in turn, are residuals from an equation that explains quarterly
changes in money as a function of six lagged dependent variables, a
federal spending variable, and lagged unemployment. The implied reduced
form thus basically explaIns price changes by money changes, the two
government spending variables, lagged unemployment, and the time trend.
There is no consideration of any of the supply factors discussed below
in Section VI.
18. This does not deny a role for the prices of other inputs, e.g., capital
or raw materials, since these variables can be entered as relative
prices. See the more complete specification of the price mark—up
equation in Gordon (1975, p. 620).
19. In column (2) and all of the other equations presented inthis paper
the lagged dependent variable is adjusted to remove the estimated
impact of the controls. Thus we assume that the impact of the termina-
tion of controls in raising 1974 inflation does notcarry over in making
inflation higher in 1975. This adjustment marginally improves the
standard error of estimate of the basic equation in column (8), and has the
advantage that the effects of controls may be seen in the coefficient estimates,
rather than in the alternative dynamic simulations necessary if the controls
have persistent effects.
20. The exact method of performing the "stripping"process is described
in Gordon (1975, pp. 656—660). This variable was updated using the
methods described in that source to the end of 1976, and has been extra—
polated using a regression of the 1954—76 variable on current and lagged
values of the deflators of consumer direct expenditures on food and
energy.70
21. For previous uses of this specification, see Gordon (1971, pp. 128—9)
and (1975, pp. 619—20).
22. The interaction with y comes in years like 1975—76, when the equation
in column (5) "cannot understand" why inflation declined despite an
acceleration in y, but in column (6) has the rapid growth of actual
productivity available as an included variable to help explain the
inflation slowdown. The interaction with the lagged dependent variable
comes in 1969—70, when column (5) "needs" a high sum of coefficients on
lagged inflation to explain high inflation but in column (6) has the
help of the 1969—70 productivity slowdown.
23. The variable is calculated as the percentage change in (1/(l—-r)), where
Tisthe ratio of total Federal and state social security contributions
to total wage and salary income in the national income accounts.
24. Cordon (1977) in Tables 2 and 3 shows that unity constraints substantially
improve the ability of equations estimated to the 1954—71 period to track
the 1971—76 period in post—sample simulations.
25. Constraining the sum of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable
(LDV) and on y to sum to unity is not straightforward if the shape of the
polynomial lag distribution is to be freely estimated in the constrained
equation. We have used an iterative procedure in which the freely
estimated coefficients on the LDV andy are divided by their joint sum, and
that part of inflation not explained by unity constrained LDV andy is
regressed on the other right—hand variables. The fitted value of this
first regression equation represents the contribution of the other variables
to the explanation of inflation. The next step is to run a second regression
explaining the difference between the actual dependent variable and the71
fitted value from the first step (i.C., the portion of inflation that
cannot be explained by the other variables) in which the right hand
variables are and a polynomial distributed lag on the LDV. The
process is repeated until the sum of squared residuals in the two
equations converge.
26. Since the cumulative error over 2.5 years is L4 percentage points, the
simulation after adjustment for the exchange rate effect underpredicts
the annual inflation rate during 1978—80 by about 0.6 percentage points
on average.
27. Perry's most recent research (1980) limits the guidelines dummy to
1964 and 1965, in contrast to his earlier work that included 1963.
28. Line B.9, "Dynamic Adjustment,'t shows the change in the equilibrium
simulation of line A.3.
29. Nominal GNP growth was rapid in l97l:Q1 due to th& rebound effect from
the 1970 General Motors strike.